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Section 1: Introduction
Obesity is typically treated as a problem of public health or
personal attractiveness. It is those things but it is even more an eco-
nomic phenomenon. More than many physical conditions, obesity is
avoidable by behavioral changes, which economists expect to be
undertaken if the benefits exceed the costs. Investigating whether
the economic benefits and costs of obesity can fruitfully be used to
explain its variations across time and populations is the principal task
of this paper.
In ordinary language, “obesity” is a pejorative term, as the related
term “overweight” makes even clearer. In a rational-choice model,
there is no such thing as being “overweight.” Weight is the result of
personal choices along such dimensions as occupation, leisure-time
activity or inactivity, residence, and, of course, food intake.
Therefore, being either fat or thin may be as desirable as adhering to
the norms of weight set by doctors and the public health
community. At least since the 1960s (see Ippolito and Mathios
(1995)), it has been known by the medical profession and widely
disseminated to the public that obesity impairs health and longevity.
It is currently estimated that mortality due to non-optimal levels of
exercise and food-intake is second only to tobacco consumption in
the number of deaths that could be prevented by behavioral change
(McGinnis and Foege (1993)). Yet the percentage of obese people,
commonly if rather arbitrarily defined as those who are more than
20 percent above their medically determined “ideal” weight, has been
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growing worldwide.1 In one recent decade the percentage of
Americans who are more than twenty percent above their “ideal”
weight increased from about 25 percent to about 33 percent.2 It has
been argued that almost 60 percent of Americans do not exercise
enough from the standpoint of controlling their weight (NIH
(1995)). The increase in obesity has given rise to demands for public
intervention, mainly in the form of education programs, to reduce
obesity through diet and exercise.
We argue that there are important economic reasons for this
long-run growth in obesity. Technological change has both lowered
the cost of intake of calories and raised the cost of expending
calories, hence contributing in two ways to the rise in obesity. The
technologically induced rise in obesity offers many predictions, such
as a natural interpretation of such puzzling phenomena as that obe-
sity has grown even though there has been little or no increase in
calorie consumption, and indeed a rise in exercising and dieting.
The price of calories has fallen because food prices have declined
and income has grown and, consequently, a rise in weight would be
a natural consequence, but it would be due solely to a rise in calorie
consumption. An equally important change has been the amount of
physical exertion required when supplying labor. In an agricultural or
(to a somewhat lesser extent) an industrial society, work is strenuous;
in effect, the worker is paid to exercise; what is more, in such a
society, in which public welfare is ungenerous, the cost of not
exercising through work could be dire—it could include starvation.
Technological change has freed up time from producing food,
enabling a reallocation of time to producing other goods and
eventually to producing services. In a postindustrial and redistributive
society, such as that of the United States today, most work entails
little exercise and not working does not reduce weight; hence, people
must pay for undertaking, rather than be paid to undertake, physical
activity. This payment is mostly in terms of foregone leisure, so that
                                                
1 The most comprehensive estimates of worldwide obesity is through the so-
called MONICA study (see Obesity: Preventing and Managing The Global
Epidemic, World Health Organization, Geneva, 1997, p. 19).
2 VanItallie (1996), p. 891 (tab. 2) documents an age-adjusted increase in the
prevalence of overweight among persons 20 to 74 years of age from 25.4 per-
cent to 33.3 percent between 1976–1980 and 1988–1991. See also Kuczmarski et
al. 1994.
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leisure weight control must substitute for job weight control. The
jogging and gym revolution and the limiting of calorie consumption
as a result in part of deliberate dieting can be interpreted as
substitutions brought about by technological changes in work.
Despite these forces operating to reduce obesity, overall obesity may
rise as a result of a growth in the sedentary nature of work. Indeed,
the technology-of-work explanation of increased obesity is almost
inevitable; since calorie consumption has fallen, physical activity
must have fallen for obesity to have increased.
But if, as we believe, income increases the demand for thinness,
this will imply that in technologically advanced countries, there will
be a negative relationship between income and weight while in less
technologically advanced countries the relationship will be positive.
It also implies that technologically induced obesity growth will be
self-limiting when it makes workers sufficiently richer. Increases in
per capita income, while on the one hand associated with the shift
from heavy to light work, both being consequences largely of
technological progress, on the other hand increase the demand for
thinness.
We conclude by considering the role of the expanding public
interventions to reduce obesity.3 There have been dramatic warnings
about an existing international obesity “epidemic,” but a rational-
choice perspective calls into question the case for public interventions
designed to reduce obesity. If health is not everything in life, rational
people will eat more and exercise less than medical science advises
them because they prefer such behavior to better health and a longer
life. In particular, people may prefer their high paying sedentary jobs
to more physically demanding ones with less pay. Preferences and
technology determine obesity and will probably be little affected by
public education campaigns about ways to limit weight gains.
The distinction is between an individual’s being overweight in a
medical sense, which from a rational-choice perspective does not call
for public intervention, and the population’s being overweight in a
                                                
3 For a comprehensive call for public international intervention, see Obesity:
Preventing and Managing The Global Epidemic, World Health Organization,
Geneva, 1997. For the United States, see e.g., the initiative Healthy People
2000 (www.health.gov/healthypeople), or The President’s Council on Physical
Fitness, the agency in charge for carrying out the objectives.
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social Pareto-inferior way, implying that people would be willing to
pay others to reduce weight. Interventions in the food market may
induce overweight in the social Pareto sense. The food-stamp
program, for example, may raise the incidence of obesity among
lower-income persons. Antismoking measures may likewise increase
obesity and by doing so reduce the health benefits of these measures,
because smoking is a substitute method of weight control, and so the
heavy taxes and regulations aimed at smokers may induce people to
be overweight in a Pareto sense. We doubt that obesity generates
negative externalities large enough to justify government
intervention to reduce its prevalence4, but in any event such
measures should be discussed in light of an understanding of how
private behavior has induced the growth in obesity.
There has been little economic analysis of the forces
contributing to obesity, although the question is related to, but
distinct from, other human capital issues in health.5 The neglect by
economists is surprising because more Americans are obese than
smoke, use illegal drugs, or suffer from obesity-unrelated ailments;
because obesity is a substantial risk factor in most highly prevalent
serious diseases, including heart disease, cancer, and diabetes and
therefore affects major public programs such as Medicare and Social
Security; because obesity affects wages; and because Americans spend
in the aggregate many billions of dollars each year trying to lose
weight through dieting or exercise. Attempting to understand what
has contributed to the growth in obesity, and the impact this has
had on the demand and supply for health care, therefore seems a
natural topic for health economics. The main analytical difference
introduced by weight as a health stock is that of a nonmonotonicity.
People have an ideal weight that they prefer not to be above or
below, and this nonmonotonic effect of weight on utility drives
many of our results, such as the change in sign induced by economic
development on the income effect on weight.
                                                
4 However, see Keeler et al (1989) estimate the external costs imposed by those
of sedentary life-styles through lack of price-discrimination in insurance
coverage.
5 See, e.g., Grossman (1972), Arthur (1982), Ehrlich and Chuma (1992),
Rosen (1988, 1994), Philipson and Becker (1997), and Cawley (1999).
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Section 2: The Demand for Weight
The Determination of Weight without Labor Supply
We first consider the individual’s choice of weight when
income is exogenous. This case is simpler and serves as a useful
illustration of the main effects that operate in the more general case
when income is earned through participating in the labor market.
Consider an individual with income I for whom the net
consumption of calories less spending on physical activity is denoted
F for “food.” Weight is affected by the net intake of calories
according to the increasing function W(F); that is, a higher net
intake of calories raises weight. Utility U(W(F),C,F) is defined over
weight, alternative consumption (denoted C), and net intake of
calories. An important property of the utility function is its
monotonicity. Specifically, it has an inverted U-shape; there is an
ideal weight Wo which the individual does not prefer to be above or
below. We assume that this ideal weight does not depend on other
goods, so that the cross-partials are zero, UWF= UWC =0. In other
words, Wo is the weight that would be chosen if achieving one’s
preferred weight was costless. We also assume diminishing marginal
utility from raising net intake of calories, UFF £  0, and that
changing one’s weight affects one’s utility more the further away
from one’s ideal weight one is; that is, the inverted U-shaped
function over weight is concave (UWW £  0).
A person’s ideal weight Wo may or may not correspond to the
weight that maximizes health or longevity, although it is likely to be
influenced by concern with these factors. Consequently, being
overweight is not an objective matter but a subjective one; thin girls
may prefer to lose weight and fat middle-aged men may think they
are at the weight they should be. Moreover, even people who, ceteris
paribus, preferred to be at the weight that would minimize the
adverse consequences of being overweight that are stressed by the
public health community, might choose not to be. We’ll call the
weight that the public health community thinks ideal Wm. Neither
Wo nor Wm is an optimum in the economic sense. That optimum
depends on costs as well as preference. It is found by solving
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Max U(W(F), C,F) s. t. C+ pF £  I
where p is the price of net calories. Substituting in the budget
constraint, the necessary condition for an interior choice of calories
balances the desire for consuming calories with its weight effects and
the foregone consumption of alternative goods. Thus,
UWWF+UF=pUC.
This tradeoff will lead to a desired level of calorie intake F(I,p)
and hence to weight as a function of income and price:
W(I,p)=W(F(I,p)).
Price and income have opposing effects on weight. Price raises
the cost of calories, while income lowers it by reducing the value of
the foregone consumption of other goods:
dW/dp £ 0 and dW/dI ‡  0.
A more interesting feature of the model is that there are limits
to the effect of lower prices or higher income on weight. For very
high incomes or very low prices, weight will be inelastic to them. To
see this, notice that the marginal benefit (LHS) of the first-order
condition above will be declining and become negative at the caloric
intake level, denoted Fm, that would maximize the utility from
eating if food were free. The corresponding weight W(Fm) at that
level will be larger than the ideal weight. Beyond this caloric level,
there is a marginal cost of consuming more calories even if they are
free because the gain in weight dominates the joy of eating. A
person would never consume beyond Fm regardless of the price.
Consequently, at very low prices of food further reductions in price
are unlikely to have any effect on weight. The inframarginal effect
of reducing prices or raising income is limited
limp fi 0 W(I,p) = limIfi ¥  W(I,p) =Wm
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The conditions for being rationally over- or underweight are
thus rather weak, in the sense that for many prices and incomes
W(I,p) differs from the ideal weight Wo. Consider the quasi-linear
utility function of the form
U(W(F), C,F) =(-a/2)[W(F)- Wo]2 + C + bF
when the relationship between calories and weight is proportional,
i.e., W(F)=dF. This can be shown to imply the optimal weight
W(I,p)= Wo +(b-p)/ad.
The individual is below his ideal weight if the price of calories
(p) is high relative to his preference for food (b). The amount over-
or underweight will depend on how much he cares about his weight
(a) and the impact of calorie consumption on weight (d). Clearly the
optimal weight is often different from the ideal weight. Generally,
the ideal weight is optimal when UW=0 and UF=pUC. This rarely
holds, which helps explain the number of under- and overweight
individuals and the divergence between subjective and objective
obesity. The U.S. National Center for Health Statistics reports that
about 44% of women and 25% of men who are classified as
underweight by the medical profession perceive themselves as
overweight (Statistical Abstract of the U.S. (1998), tab 243).
There is no income effect on weight in the model developed
thus far because the willingness to trade off weight and food does
not depend on income in the model. If, however, income or
consumption is complementary to weight concerns, as where there
are income-related motives to invest in health (e.g., Grossman
(1972)), then wealthier individuals will gain more from weight gains
when underweight and weight loss when overweight than poorer
individuals do. This relation can be represented by a steeper inverted
U-shaped utility over weight for wealthier individuals. In a modified
version of the utility function discussed above,
U(W(F), C,F) =(-aC/2)[W(F)- Wo]2 + C + bF,
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the marginal value of weight control is changed from being
independent of income, a, to being positively dependent on income
through consumption, C. 6 This implies that the income effect on
weight interacts positively with price, as in
d/dp[d W/dI ] ‡  0.
Hence, the effect of income on weight would fall with
development because more technologically advanced countries would
have a higher ratio of income to costs of producing food: I/p. Such
an interaction between technological advancement and the income-
weight relationship is illustrated in Figure 1.
In words, when food prices are low, other things constant,
people prefer to consume calories, but concern with being
overweight limits caloric intake. Wealthier individuals care more
about their weight, for health or other reasons, so they limit more
how much they are overweight. When food prices are high, many
people are underweight because they cannot afford sufficient caloric
intake, but wealthier individuals forgo other consumption in order to
gain weight. Consequently, technologically backward countries, in
which the share of income spent on food is large because food is
expensive to produce, will exhibit a positive relation between income
and weight because richer individuals care more about their health,
while for the same reason technologically advanced countries, in
which income is high relative to the price of food, will exhibit a
negative relationship between income and weight. Thus in poor or
early societies the more obese are relatively wealthier, but in wealthy,
more modern societies the more obese are relatively poorer. Without
other effects operating at the same time, such as the effect of
technological change on the sedentary nature of work discussed in
the next section, income growth will tend to make obesity growth
self-limiting.
                                                
6 The necessary first-order condition would be ap/2[W(F)- Wo]2 - a[I-
pF]/2[W(F) - Wo]d=p-b in which the marginal cost of non-ideal weight rises
with income.
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The Allocation of Time, Technological Change, and Obesity
This section considers the effects of the allocation of time, and
in particular labor supply, on weight. The hours or weeks one works
affect weight in at least two respects. The first is through increasing
earned income, which we have shown has an important effect on
weight. The second is through affecting the amount of calories
expended on the job. In physically demanding jobs, workers get paid
to exercise. As technological change has lowered the calories spent
per hour worked, it has reduced the financial incentives to control
weight and so has raised obesity, but this has been accompanied by a
rise in off-the-job calorie spending, e.g., the recent rise in jogging
and gyms,7 a substitution brought about by change in the nature of
work.
To incorporate the allocation of time in the analysis, we
generalize the budget constraint to include earned income in
addition to unearned income
C+pF+qE £  wH+I
where w is the hourly wage, q is the resource cost of exercising, and
H is hours worked. The time constraint states that time allocated to
exercise (off-the-job calorie spending), together with leisure and
work, cannot exceed available time
H+L+E £  T.
The time spent in off the job exercise, E, thus consists of active
measures of weight reduction. These measures, which need not be
intended to control weight, include smoking, taking diet pills (as
distinct from eating less), and non-working time devoted to exercise;
hence “leisure” in our analysis is limited to physically inert as distinct
from physically active leisure-time activities.
Weight is now affected by food, labor supply, and off-the-job
exercise W(F,H,E). The marginal effect of work on weight, WH,
                                                
7 On the efficacy of leisure-time physical activity as a method of weight
control, see, e.g., Haapanen et al. (1997); Williamson et al. (1993).
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can be negative, if work involves exercise, or positive, if work is
sedentary. Technological change has raised the marginal impact of
labor supply on weight; the calories spent per hours working has
fallen as economies have gone from being agricultural to being based
on manufacturing and now to being based on services. The
individual chooses hours of work and of exercise, as well as of food
consumption, to maximize
U(W(F,H,E), I+wH–pF–qE, F, T–H–E).
The necessary first-order conditions for an interior maximum
are
(1) UWWH+UCw=UL (Labor Supply)
(2) UWWE+UE=UCq+UL  (Exercise)
(3) UWWF+UF=UCp  (Calories).
Equation (2) implies, for anyone who does exercise, that since
(inert) leisure presumably is valued (so that UL>0) and exercise
reduces weight (WE<0), weight must, at the margin, have a negative
effect on utility (UW>0); otherwise no one would exercise. By the
same token, for someone who does not exercise, the marginal effect
of weight on utility must be positive, since lack of exercise will tend
to lead to a weight gain. This in turn implies that in equation (1)
the utility that an exercising person obtains from working an extra
hour in a sedentary job is less (other things equal) than for a non-
exercising person, because the extra hour of sedentary work versus
exercise results in higher weight, while this relation between the
benefits/costs of extra work is reversed for nonsedentary work (the
exerciser benefits more). And in equation (3), the exerciser derives
more, and the nonexerciser less, utility from consumption of other
goods.
The full effect of any parameter x on weight depends on how it
directly affects weight-holding inputs constant together with how it
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affects the inputs into producing weight. Differentiating weight
with respect to x yields:
dW/dx=Wx+ WF(dF/dx) + WH(dH/dx) + WE(dE/dx).
Consider the effect of changes in the sedentary nature of jobs,
that is, that people historically had to exercise to get paid but today
do not. The model may seem to imply that utility is maximized at a
higher weight if WH=0 than if WH>0. Hence the secular shift in
work from manufacturing and mining to services implies, because
most (though not all) services involve light work, that average
weight will be higher in modern, developed nations because there is
less on-the-job exercise. This implication continues to hold if we
consider the impact of wages on weight. The technological change
that lowers physical activity on the job also raises productivity and
hence wages, which in turn affect weight by affecting hours
worked, exercise, and food consumption. The effects are
unambiguous for exercise and food: an increase in wages raises the
opportunity cost of time devoted to exercise and so lowers the
amount of exercise and therefore raises weight, and an increase in
earned income also increases the amount of food consumed. The
effect of wages on weight through the effect on the number of
hours worked is ambiguous because the work is sedentary, the effect
will be to increase weight, and if it is nonsedentary to decrease it.
But given the shift from manufacturing to services, the analysis of
the effect of wages on weight reinforces the conclusion from the
shift itself.
To illustrate these arguments more precisely, consider the
simple form of the weight function
W(F,H,E)=W(F-(1/h)H-E)
where a rise in the parameter h represents fewer calories expended
per hour worked. Assume that wages are related to this technology
through w(h), which is an increasing function: less physically
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demanding work is associated with wage gains8. The total weight
effect of technological change is given by
dW/dh=Wh + WF(dF/dh) + WH(dH/dh) + WE(dE/dh).
The effects of technology on the inputs into weight are a direct
effect through h and an indirect effect through the rise in the wage:
dK/dh=Kh+Kwwh for K=F,H,E. The first direct effect of
technological change on weight is positive, holding the inputs
constant, simply because fewer calories are expended at work: Wh ‡
0. This effect may dominate the effect due to the input changes.
More important, these inputs may be offsetting the direct effect on
weight, so that weight gains may occur although food intake is
falling and off the job exercise is rising. In other words, dW/dh ‡  0
may hold together with dF/dh £  0 and dE/dh ‡  0. Tugging the
other way is the assumed positive income elasticity of the demand for
thinness in wealthy countries, itself a consequence in part of rising
wages. The observed jogging and gym revolution and the fall in
calorie consumption, including dieting, is a substitution brought
about by technological change at work and may offset a rise in
obesity due to work-related technological change.
People may respond to the lower amount of calories spent at
work in different ways. It might seem that since reducing the
amount of food consumed reduces money costs, while increasing the
amount of exercise increases time costs, poor people concerned about
their weight would prefer to diet, as that would free up resources for
alternative consumption, while rich people concerned about their
weight would reallocate their non-work time from leisure to
exercise. The secular decline in the monetary cost of food, however,
might be expected to lead poor people to substitute food for other
forms of consumption, an effect amplified by the food-stamp
program, and hence to become fatter. This substitution would be
less likely for rich people because the demand for food by rich people
                                                
8 Such earnings effects of sedentary technological change may change estimates
of the external costs imposed by the obesity on the thin through public
insurance (see e.g. Keeler et al (1989)).
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is less price elastic (see Popkin (1999), p. 144), the health risk and
other “disbenefits” of eating being a larger component of the full
cost of food for rich than poor people.
Consistent with this suggestion, there is considerable evidence
that obesity today falls with income and education in rich countries
(see, e.g., Jeffery et al. 1991). An interesting cross-country
comparison is between the United States and Europe. Food is
cheaper in the United States than in Europe; Europe is less
“suburbanized” than the United States; and this, plus the much
higher price of gasoline in Europe than in the United States (due to
steep difference in gasoline-tax rates), causes Europeans to be less
sedentary. On all three counts we expect Americans to be fatter, on
average, than Europeans; and it appears that they are, although
comparison is difficult because of different methods of measuring
obesity (on both points, see Seidell (1995)). Another difference is
that Americans watch television much more than Europeans, in
part because American television offers much more variety than Eu-
ropean. About half the leisure time of the average American is spent
watching television (Robinson and Godbey (1997))—a completely
sedentary activity.9 The higher the quality of television is, the higher
is the cost of exercise and hence the lower the demand for thinness,
other things being equal. Television is a peculiar product because the
marginal pecuniary cost of consumption is zero (except for pay
television), and so small increases in perceived quality may lead to
significant increases in amount demanded.
Asymmetric Information and Obesity as a Signal
It is often argued that income was positively related to weight
historically because being obese indicated a high status when not
everyone could afford to eat. This is essentially an argument of
weight as a signal under asymmetric information about wealth, and
provides an alternative to our hypothesis, which emphasizes food
prices and the effect of changes in labor technology. In the
nineteenth century, thinness was a signal of malnutrition and
tuberculosis, and fatness a signal of prosperity; stout men and
women were therefore considered handsome and stout women
                                                
9 Except for people who use exercise machines at home or in gyms. Such
machines, especially treadmills, can be used while watching television.
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beautiful and sexy.10 Of course, it may be doubted how many people
actually overate in order to signal prosperity, since alternative, less
costly signals were available. With the virtual eradication of malnu-
trition and tuberculosis in the wealthy countries, and with expendi-
tures on food a steadily falling percentage of household expenditures,
obesity ceased to have value in signaling valued traits; instead it
became a negative signal (Cassell (1995)). Today, thinness may be
valued as a signal of trustworthiness, both because it indicates a
degree of self-control or self-discipline (Brownell (1991), p. 4) and
because it indicates an orientation to the long term that is correlated
with the possession of character traits important in employees who
are not continuously monitored. One aspect that limits the signaling
explanation of obesity, however, is that weight is an imperfect signal.
People differ in their genetic ability to control their weight
(Bouchard (1991); Brownell (1991), p. 8), and so one’s amount of
willpower or self-discipline cannot simply be “read off” from one’s
thinness.
Weight as a signal would imply as with other signaling activities
that there may be overinvestment in thinness from a social stand-
point, which in turn would cast doubt on the value of public pro-
grams designed to combat obesity. The overinvestment thesis is
supported by the fact that women compete to be even thinner than
men consider optimally attractive (see, e.g., Czajka-Narina, Dorice,
and Parham 1990).
Section 3: The Supply of Obesity
Obesity is a supply as well as a demand phenomenon. Calories
influence obesity and are supplied in food; caloric reduction is
supplied in the form of dietary advice, discrimination and ridicule,
and exercise advice, facilities, and equipment. We have already
stressed the important components of food suppliers by reducing
prices through agricultural technological change. We argued that
this technological change on the supply side had two positive effects
                                                
10 To see this clearly, imagine that people spend 100 percent of their income
on food, which is approximately true historically. Then poor people will eat
less than rich and so be thinner, and weight will be a good signal of income.
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on obesity; the first to lower food prices, the second to lower the
calories spent per hour worked. 11
A curious supply feature of calories that affects supply behavior,
and one with important implications for producers and public policy,
is that the intensive and the extensive margins of consumption are
substitutes, because “excessive” caloric intake impairs longevity, rather
than complements. Compare the case of pharmaceuticals, where
consumption increases longevity and, in turn consumption. A tax on
calories (parallel to the tax proposed in the first Clinton
administration on British Thermal Units (BTUs)) would reduce
consumption of high-calorie foods in the short run, but there would
be an offset in the long run because people would be living longer.
In contrast, a tax on pharmaceuticals would unambiguously reduce
consumption because it would have a depressive effect on both
margins.
There are a number of possible supply side explanations for the
puzzling increase in the obesity of Americans in the 1980s. First,
because of the increased opportunity costs of household production,
the 1980s witnessed a shift in food consumption from homemade
food to restaurant (including fast food) and carryout food (Haines et
al. (1992)). Homemakers and restaurants have different incentives
with regard to caloric supply. The homemaker presumably
internalizes the health costs of a calorically rich diet; the restaurateur
does not. Hence the latter will have a greater incentive to supply
foods that create addictive cravings (such as sweets). (For empirical
evidence, see Haines et al. (1992).) Competition could in principle
correct this externality; some restaurant owners would advertise and
sell healthful meals. The problem is that since the benefits of a
healthful diet are long term, consumers will tend to mistrust such
advertising; poorer consumers, who have high discount rates and
high costs of information, may be completely beyond the influence
of such advertising. Consumers will be more trusting of advertising
for diets and exercise machines, since short-term weight losses are
feasible and will be observed, enabling the consumer to verify the
advertiser’s claims.
                                                
11 See Geoffard and Philipson (1998) for a more general discussion of this link
between the two margins of consumption.
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Another possibly relevant development in the 1980s is the
decline in (male) cigarette smoking (Grunberg and Klein (1998), p.
174; WHO (1999)), a result in part of governmental measures to
discourage smoking. Because of its weight-controlling effect,
smoking is a substitute for exercise, and for many people a lower-cost
substitute since it is less time- and effort-intensive, and often less
costly (when exercise requires buying expensive equipment or joining
a health club). If the cost of smoking rises either because of price
increases (for example as a result of increases in the excise tax on
cigarettes) or because of nonmonetary factors such as restrictions on
where one may smoke or increased fear of lung cancer, then weight
will rise to the extent that exercise is not a perfect substitute,
although the availability of exercise as a substitute will limit the effect
of a higher real cost of smoking on weight.
Still another factor is the improvement in the supply of medical
technology. The principal health risk created by obesity is heart
disease, because of the effect of obesity on serum cholesterol levels,
blood pressure, sedentariness, and diabetes (itself a potent risk factor
for heart disease). Technological improvements in the treatment of
heart disease by drugs, surgery, and intensive-care units reduce the
cost of obesity, in just the same way that improved treatments for
sexually transmitted disease reduce the cost of unsafe sex. If the risk
falls, this causes the price to fall, resulting in a higher demand. Since
women are at less risk from heart disease than men, we can expect
them to use greater inputs of smoking relative to exercise than men
in attempting to control weight.
The first two hypotheses (shift to restaurant eating, and decline
in smoking) are not well supported. The first implies an increase in
average caloric intake, but it has decreased (e.g., Heini and Weinsier
(1997)); and the effect of smoking on weight is small may be small
while studies show that increased body mass immediately follows
smoking cessation (see O’Hara et all. (1998), Green and Harari
(1995), Flegal et al (1995), and Gerace et al. (1991)), few studies
have followed former smokers after five years of cessation, so it is
unclear whether the weight gain is permanent (Mizoue et al.
(1998)). The decline in caloric intake, when coupled with the
increase in weight suggests that physical activity decreased, which is
plausible in light of the spread of labor-saving devices in homes and
workplaces (see also Bouchard (1991)), and it has been argued that
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the benefits of exercise are often exaggerated because exercise substi-
tutes for other forms of calorie-burning physical activity12 (Heini
and Weinsier (1997)).
To summarize, improved medical intervention may have
reduced the demand for thinness at the same time that increased
costs of exercise (whether due to continued substitute of light for
strenuous work, more television channels, or more household labor-
saving devices) were increasing the supply price of thinness.
It is important to note, moreover, that there is nothing
paradoxical in a reduction in caloric intake being associated with a
decline in physical activity. It does not imply that people are
inconsistent, that they want to lose weight so they eat less but then
gain it back by exercising less. Food consumption and exercise are
complements with respect to desired weight, since a reduction in
food consumption reduces the marginal value of exercise, and vice
versa. It is therefore easy to see that if at the same time that food
consumption is falling (for exogenous reasons) the cost of exercise is
increasing, the decline in food consumption may be negatively
correlated with weight.
Section 4: Public Intervention to Limit Obesity
We conclude by considering the role of the expanding public
interventions designed to limit or reduce the growth in obesity. The
public health community has again blown the whistle on another
forthcoming “crisis”—an international obesity “epidemic.” Adoption
of a rational-choice perspective casts doubt on the case for public in-
terventions designed to reduce obesity. One distinction here is
between an individual’s being overweight in a medical sense, that is
W being different from the ideal weight specified by other people,
namely public health specialists—a discrepancy that does call for
public intervention, and a population that is overweight with respect
to its own ideal weight Wo. But the case for public regulation does
not concern deviations from either of these ideals, but rather
concerns deviations from the Pareto optimism weight, deviations
people are willing to pay others to reduce or eliminate.
                                                
12 For example, a person may do less walking in order to make time for going
to the gym.
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Does obesity create negative externalities that might warrant
public intervention, whether in the form of a calorie tax, subsidies
for exercise, a tax on exercise substitutes such as driving, or public
education subsidies? Although most people would derive benefits
from increased “beauty” of strangers encountered in the streets and
other public places and beauty in our society is negatively related to
obesity, the pecuniary and nonpecuniary private benefits of beauty
are so great that the elasticity of weight to tax or subsidy policies
would probably be small. Moreover, personal beauty is a positional
good: one is beautiful in comparison with other people who are less
good looking. An increase in the number of beautiful people harms
the people who are already beautiful and so may not increase
aggregate social welfare.
It might seem obvious that since medical care is heavily sub-
sidized, and obesity increases morbidity and mortality (see, e.g., K.
Narbro et al. (1996)), taxing obesity in some fashion would be bound
to reduce a negative externality. But this ignores the fact that
reducing mortality increases the fraction of the population that is
elderly, and the elderly not only consume a disproportionate fraction
of medical expenditures but are more heavily subsidized for those
expenditures than younger people.
There are two tradeoffs here: one between health expenditures
per period and the number of periods (that is, the length of life), and
the other between the subsidized and the nonsubsidized fraction of
health expenditures. Suppose that taxing obesity would reduce
average per-period medical expenditures by 10 percent but increase
average length of life by 5 percent; then lifetime medical expendi-
tures would fall by approximately 5 percent. But suppose further that
the percentage of lifetime expenditures subsidized would in-
crease—because more people would be living to Medicare-eligibility
age—from 20 percent to 30 percent. Then the size of the net
subsidy would increase by roughly 40 percent.
A further consideration is that efforts to lose weight impose
their own health costs. Apart from the direct costs of diet pills and
the like, there is the indirect cost of eating disorders and dangerous
weight loss brought about by efforts to lose weight (see e.g., Flynn
(1997)).
Notice that if obesity did create a negative externality, the
current campaign to reduce smoking would be perverse, since
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smoking is a method of weight control. From the standpoint of
controlling weight, smoking should be subsidized rather than taxed.
Notice also that since smoking and obesity are substitutes, we can
expect cigarette producers to join with meat producers in opposing
the taxing of obesity, since an increase in obesity would stimulate the
demand for cigarettes.
Overall, one may argue that the case has not been made that
obesity generates negative externalities large enough to justify
government intervention to reduce its prevalence. The case has
certainly been made that weights deviate from those medically
optimal. But so does any other behavior that involves health risks,
such as driving on highways, and we do not want to reduce the
benefits of those behaviors even though they entail costs. At the very
least, public measures should be discussed in light of an
understanding of why private behavior have induced the observed
growth in obesity over time.
Section 5: Concluding Remarks
This paper attempts to analyze the forces contributing to the
worldwide long-run rise in obesity and the role of public
interventions in affecting its continued growth. A growth in obesity
in a population must result from growth of calorie consumption
outpacing growth of physical activity. This paper considered the
economic incentives that give rise to such a growth in obesity by
stimulating intake of calories at the same time as discouraging
spending these calories on physical activity.
We argued that technological change provided a natural
interpretation of these long-run changes but that it also implies that
obesity growth is self-limiting.
Our analysis suggests several avenues of future research. The
first would be to assess empirically the extent to which physical
activity on the job has affected obesity. This may be done with
available data sets (such as The Nutrition and Health Examination
Surveys (NHANES) in the US) by looking across occupational
categories at how people have changed their food consumption and
total physical activity, whether on or off the job activity. Such an
analysis should also address the limited ability of the changed
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incentives for on the job exercise to explain the rise in obesity among
children.
Second, our analysis was limited in its predictions on gender
differences in weight and the role of matching markets in
determining weight. If weight affects one’s ability to match, we
would expect unmarried people today, as searchers in the marriage
market, to be thinner than married people, implying that the rise in
the age of marriage and the rate of divorce in recent decades has
actually increased the average (physical) health of the population.
The problem in attributing too large a role to matching markets is
that rising divorce rates would imply a decline in obesity. In addition,
rational expectations would tend to limit the value of temporary
reductions in weight at the initial phase of the match.
It is empirically true and interesting that women are more
concerned with their weight than men and are more likely to be
dieting (Brownell (1991), p. 4). The greater value of thinness to
women than to men is reflected in studies that find a greater
negative correlation between earnings and overweight for women
than for men (see, e.g., Register and Williams (1990), Averett and
Koreman (1996), and Pagán and Dávila (1997)). Since marriage can
be viewed as a type of employment, each spouse being viewed as the
other’s employer, these studies imply that a wife’s household “wage”
is reduced more by obesity than her husband’s household “wage” is.
The reason is that men value physical attractiveness in women more
than women value physical attractiveness in men (see, with specific
reference to obesity, Sobal, Nicolopoulos, and Lee (1995)). Yet an
unanswered question is, if thinness is more valuable to women than
to men, why are more women overweight (see Rodin (1993))?
A particularly interesting case concerns African American
women, a much higher percentage of whom than of white women
(49.2 percent versus 33.5 percent) are overweight (VanItallie (1996),
p. 891 (tab. 2) and Chitwood et al. (1996)). There are two possible
economic reasons to expect black women to be more obese on
average than white even after correction for other differences, such
as genetic (Argyropoulos (1998)). The first is that among poor
people, who in this country are disproportionately black, thinness
continues to be a signal of possible poor health or bad habits—drug
addicts, alcoholics, people with AIDS, and homeless people tend to
be thin because of malnutrition or disease. It is not surprising,
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therefore, that although there is a positive correlation in the black
community between slenderness and attractiveness (see Riley (1998),
Harris (1995), and Thomas (1988)), black women have higher
weight ideals than the ultrathin ideals held by white women (Flynn
(1996)). Second, the marriage market is badly stacked against black
women (Mullin (1998); Philipson and Posner (1993), pp. 75–78).
This could incite even greater efforts of some women to achieve
attractiveness, but it would reduce the gains from attractiveness to
those women who had very poor marital prospects even with an
incremental increase in attractiveness. When young black
marriageable men are hard to find, the matching incentive for
weight control of black women is reduced.
Lastly, empirical analysis has focused on the average behavior of
weight over time and populations. Given that, by definition, obesity
concerns the tail of the weight distribution, future analysis may
fruitfully address whether the average tendencies in the population
mimic the behavior in those tails. For example, it may be that there
are offsetting changes in food consumption for the bottom and top
part of the distribution that masks much of the data that focus on
average behavior.
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